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Abstract 
In this paper we analyze the evolution of firm financial efficiency in the Czech Republic. 
Using a large panel of more than 400,000 Czech firm/years we study whether firms fully 
utilize their resources, how firm financial efficiency evolves over time, and how firm financial 
efficiency is determined by ownership structure. We employ a panel version of a stochastic 
production frontier model for the period 1996–2007 with time-invariant efficiency. We 
differentiate among various degrees of ownership concentration and their domestic or foreign 
origin. In a two-stage set-up we estimate the degree of firm inefficiency and then we estimate 
the effect of ownership structure on the distance from the efficiency frontier. Our results 
support the hypothesis that concentration and foreign ownership are positively related to 
financial efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
The economic reforms of the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were aimed at 
creating competitive market economies and more efficient enterprises by firm restructuring, 
privatization, and supporting institutional reforms (Estrin et al., 2009). Still, there is a lack of 
reliable empirical evidence on medium- and long-term firm efficiency and the determinants of 
efficiency in post-transition economies in the CEE region (Estrin et al., 2009; Hanousek et al., 
2007a). We fill this gap in the literature by analyzing the financial efficiency of Czech firms 
and how this efficiency is determined by ownership structures. We employ a stochastic 
production frontier model and use unique firm-level panel data of more than 400,000 
firm/year observations for the period 1996–2007. Our results are in line with the theoretical 
predictions that concentration and foreign ownership are positively related to financial 
efficiency (Hill and Snell, 1989; Blomström et al., 2001) and shed light on many other 
subtleties of how ownership affects firm efficiency. 
 In our research we analyze two kinds of firms: privatized formerly state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and newly established firms. The privatization of the SOEs in the former 
command economies in Central and Eastern Europe has been at the center of a debate among 
economists and policy makers since the late 1980s. The SOEs were originally established to 
ensure a better provision of public goods as well as political control of production in centrally 
planned economies. However, they turned out not to be able to keep up with technical and 
innovative progress. For this reason both economists and policy makers expected SOEs’ 
efficiency to increase after privatization under new owners and management. In the same 
spirit, newly established firms were expected to exhibit high performance as they were 
established by new owners with a focus on core competence and profits. In this spirit we 
analyze how the financial outcomes of firms are linked to working capital and the cost of 
labor. 
Our paper is therefore related to two strands of literature. First, we contribute to the 
literature examining the effects of ownership structure on firm performance in transition 
countries (see Boycko et al., 1996 for a theoretical treatment and Djankov and Murell, 2002; 
Morck et al, 2005; and Estrin et al., 2009 for empirical surveys). The actual literature almost 
uniformly suggests that privatization to foreign owners greatly increases efficiency. The effect 
of domestic ownership is largely also positive but not as much as the effect of foreign 
ownership. This is the case only for Central European economies. In CIS countries the effect 
of domestic ownership is insignificant or slightly negative (Estrin et al., 2009; Brown et al., 
2006). In addition, these efficiency differences between domestic- and foreign-owned firms 
do not seem to diminish over time (see e.g., Blomstrom, 1988; Haddad and Harrison, 1993; 
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Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Estrin et al., 2009).1 Several studies 
examine the concentration of ownership and find that it plays an important role, with majority 
private ownership having mostly positive effects on productivity (Pivovarsky, 2003; 
Claessens and Djankov, 1999); the overall positive effect is again driven primarily by foreign-
owned firms. Finally, some studies suggest that de novo firms are more productive than or at 
least as productive as SOEs privatized to domestic owners (Sabirianova et al., 2005a). In 
contrast to the above review, the literature on firm efficiency in CEE countries is rather 
limited. Little is known about the technical efficiency of firms that underwent restructuring 
during the transformation process towards a market economy.  
Second, our paper is related to the literature estimating technical efficiency. We 
employ the stochastic production possibility frontier approach introduced by Aigner et al. 
(1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), and further adapted for panel data and time-
varying technical efficiency by Khumbhakar (1990) and Battese and Coelli (1995). Although 
this methodology is well established in the empirical literature, there is still a lack of reliable 
empirical evidence on firm technical efficiency in post-transition economies. A few authors 
analyze this agenda for the pre-transition years, finding that there is substantial variation 
between highly efficient firms and firms that can still achieve considerable efficiency gains. 
For instance, Brada and King (1994) analyzed the efficiency of firms in Poland. Brada et al. 
(1994) estimated the efficiency of Czechoslovak and Hungarian firms in the early 1990s using 
frontier production functions. They computed the average efficiency level for different sectors 
and found that this level varies between 40–80%.2 In addition, they found that the efficiency 
is positively related to the size of the firm. This implies that economic reforms could improve 
the technical efficiency of firms substantially. In addition, the authors test whether firm 
characteristics affect technical efficiency. As a result firm size and profitability was found to 
be positively related to efficiency whereas ownership had no significant effect. 
Methodologically, Brada et al. (1994) stress that technical efficiency can be measured 
independently of firms’ profit (or output) maximization objectives and measures of technical 
efficiency facilitate comparison across economic systems. Measuring allocative efficiency, 
which is based on selecting the mix of inputs that generates the least-cost production, 
therefore remains problematic given the periods of macroeconomic instability prevalent in 
most of the post-transformation economies. 
                                                 
1 Some of these studies do not control for possible selection effects when foreign owners purchase only the most 
productive firms. However, even after controlling for such effects (Estrin et al., 2009), the difference between 
domestic- and foreign-owned firms remains large and persistent. 
2 Indeed, most of the authors using the stochastic production possibility frontier approach compute average 
efficiencies across sectors. This approach was mainly used in agricultural economics (see Coelli, 1995 for a 
survey).  
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Further, Konings and Repkin (1998) estimated the efficiency of firms in Bulgaria 
(1993–1995) and Romania (1994–1995) using firm-level data. They used firm size (market 
share) and profitability (profit margin) to explain firm efficiency in the two countries. The 
technical efficiency of firms was found to vary significantly both within and across industrial 
sectors in each country. The findings also suggest that in the course of transition, firm 
behavior becomes more diverse, which results in an increase in the variation of firms’ 
efficiency levels within industrial branches. The results also support the hypothesis of Ickes 
and Ryterman (1993) that in a Soviet-type economy dominated by large heavy-industrial 
enterprises, efficiency levels would be high due to increased control and the assignment of 
better managers. 
Sabirianova et al. (2005b) investigate whether firms near the efficiency frontier benefit 
from implementing development policies. The authors use 1992–2000 panel data on industrial 
firms in the Czech Republic and Russia to estimate a translog production function on panel 
data from medium and large firms in the two economies. They estimate the average efficiency 
level rather than the individual levels and their specification contains rather simple categories 
of ownership (the categories include private domestically owned; state, including federal, 
regional and municipal; mixed and foreign). They find that domestic-owned firms have not 
been converging to the technological frontier set by the most efficient foreign-owned firm. 
Moreover, this gap increased in the short term and was stable in the medium term. 
Linz and Rahkovsky (2009) provide a systematic analysis of the level of and industry 
variation in technical inefficiency at the beginning of Russia’s transition period by estimating 
a stochastic frontier production function for eleven industries with inefficiency effects related 
to ownership, export experience, and location in Moscow. The firms from eleven industries 
are grouped into three categories: heavy, light, and other industry. Their results generally 
support the proposition that non-state ownership improves efficiency, but the ownership effect 
varies by industry and over time. The authors reject the hypothesis that export experience 
increases efficiency during the initial stage of Russia’s transition, and this result is especially 
strong in 1995.  
Studies targeting the early stage of the transformation frequently use small and often 
unrepresentative samples of firms, often combine data from different accounting systems, and 
only have access to limited data on firm ownership. As a result, they often treat ownership as 
a relatively simple categorical concept (e.g., private versus state or state versus foreign, 
domestic private outsider versus domestic private insider), and they are often unable to 
distinguish the exact extent of ownership by individual owners or even relatively 
homogeneous groups of owners. These shortcomings prevent many studies from providing 
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accurate evidence on the effects of various ownership categories on technical efficiency. In 
this paper we advance the literature by systematically addressing issues related to the 
efficiency effects of ownership and by eliminating the earlier shortcomings. First, we use 
panel data on a large sample of medium and large firms in the Czech Republic that were 
privatized3 as well as those established as new firms; they constitute the bulk of the country’s 
economic activity. Second, we cover a five-year period when accounting rules conforming to 
the international standard (IAP) were already in place. Third, we develop a more systematic 
analytical framework for evaluating the financial efficiency effect of domestic versus foreign 
ownership, as well as the effect of various degrees of ownership concentration. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present our methodological 
approach. Data is described in Section 3. Section 4 presents our empirical results and section 
5 concludes. 
 
2. Modeling Strategy 
2.1 Theoretical background 
In our analysis we employ the stochastic production possibility frontier approach introduced 
by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) and further adapted for panel 
data by Khumbhakar (1990) and Battese and Coelli (1995). The method measures technical 
inefficiency under single output production. More important, the methodology helps to 
explain firm-level differences in efficiency as a function of the number of explanatory 
variables as opposed to estimating the average efficiency relative to the “best practice” for a 
number of sectors. 
 The methodology of the stochastic frontier approach is developed in the following 
way. A firm has the production function 
 
 ( )β;ii xfy =  
                                                 
3 A massive privatization program was administered in the Czech Republic in the first half of the 1990s under 
three different schemes: restitution, small-scale privatization, and large-scale privatization. The first two schemes 
began in 1990 and were important during the early years of the transition. Large-scale privatization, by far the 
most important scheme, began in 1991, was completed in early 1995, and allowed for various privatization 
techniques (auctions, tenders, direct sales, and free transfer). Most large- and many medium-sized firms were 
transformed into joint-stock companies and their shares were distributed through voucher privatization (almost 
one-half of the total number of all the shares of all joint stock companies were privatized in the voucher scheme), 
sold in public auctions or to strategic partners, or transferred to municipalities. The voucher scheme was part of 
the large-scale privatization process. Two waves of voucher privatization took place, in 1992–93 and 1993–94. 
Both waves were administered in the same manner and there were no differences in their set-up. During the 
scheme, a total of 1664 firms were privatized. 
 6
that defines the technological link between inputs (x) and the resulting output (y) under 
theassumption that production is conducted in an efficient manner. Due to some degree of 
inefficiency, a firm potentially produces less than it might and its production function is 
 
 ( ) iii TExfy ⋅= β; . 
 
The firm’s technical efficiency TEi represents the ratio of observed output to maximum 
feasible output and lies within the interval (0,1]; TEi is considered to be nonnegative since the 
firm’s output is assumed to be positive. If TEi = 1 then the firm employs all inputs efficiently 
and achieves an optimal output. If TEi is smaller than one then the firm experiences a degree 
of inefficiency in its production. Further, two assumptions are made. One, efficiency is a 
stochastic variable with a distribution common to all firms and can be written as TEi = exp {-
uit}; since 0 <TEi ≤ 1, then uit ≥ 0. Two, the firm’s output is also subject to various random 
shocks that encompass anything from bad weather to unexpected luck and these effects are 
denoted as exp (vit). Thus, the production function is further expanded to 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )ititii vuxfy expexp; ⋅−⋅= β . 
 
After taking the natural log of both sides we obtain 
 
  lnln
1
0 ∑
=
−++=
k
j
itititjitit uvxy ββ .      (1) 
 
In this general specification vit is a pure noise component and a two-sided normally 
distributed variable, while uit is the nonnegative technical inefficiency component. Both terms 
form a compound error term with an a priori unknown distribution. The model is estimated by 
maximum likelihood assuming a log-quadratic production function that encompasses the 
Cobb-Douglas specification and represents a less restrictive production function. 
 
2.2 Empirical approach – First stage 
We assess the determinants of firmfinancial efficiency in the following two-stage set-up. In 
the first stage we employ a Cobb-Douglas function to model firm output.The Cobb-Douglas 
production function is a convenient tool that is directly connected to the theoretical approach 
outlined earlier. From the empirical perspective Hájková and Hurník (2007) show that there is 
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no significant difference between the total factor productivity growth estimated for Czech 
firms by Cobb-Douglas and by a more general production function. Moreover, quite a few 
authors examining the transformation effects in CEE and CIS countries argue that the Cobb-
Douglas specification cannot be rejected (e.g., Brown et al., 2006; Brada et al., 1994). 
The Cobb-Douglas function assumes that input elasticities and returns to scale are 
constant, and that the elasticities of substitution are equal to one. From the empirical 
perspective both assumptions are linked to the evidence that industries within the one-digit 
NACE division differ with respect to capital intensity, labor intensity, or technology intensity 
(Bjørnskov etal., 2009; Laafia, 2002). Therefore, we follow the mainstream of the literature 
and consider the interacting parameters of the Cobb-Douglas production function with two-
digit NACE industries. As a result, in the specification below we consider different 
parameters of the Cobb-Douglas function for each two-digit NACE sector and this way we 
account for the specifics of a given sector. Formally, our model of the financial efficiency 
frontier of i firms (i = 1,…,I) in J two-digit NACE sectors (j=1,…,J) over T time periods (t = 
1,…,t) is specified as follows: 
 
0 1 2
1...
ln ln lnit j j it j it itj t it it
j J
y c l ID v uβ β β φ
=
⎡ ⎤= + + ⋅ + + −⎣ ⎦∑ .     (2) 
 
In specification (1) lnyit is the natural log of the value of the production of firm i at time t, 
measured as firm turnover. Then lncit is the natural log of the capital of each firm measured as 
working capital, and lnlit is the natural log of the firm’s labor, measured as staff costs.β0 is a 
common intercept for all firms. Working capital is the optimal proxy for the capital for our 
financial efficiency analysis. It is true that the money tied up in working capital is costly since 
it earns zero or a low rate of return (Kim et al., 1998). However, managing working capital 
efficiently stimulates growth opportunities and enables avoiding the costly interruptions of 
firms’ day today operations (Ross et al., 2005). Hence, working capital is kept invested 
constantly with the purpose to secure the constant production of a firm, which is directly 
linked to its financial efficiency. A firm’s capital can be understood as a proxy for the 
machinery used in production as input while staff costs directly proxy labor input. 
IDijt represents a vector of dummy variables to associate each firm with the specific 
industry sector j it operates in. By the construction of the model we interact dummy variables 
for each of 45 two-digit NACE industries with both inputs (capital and labor) to control for 
industry-specific effects. In addition, we divide these industry sectors into six basic groups 
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based on the different degrees of technology and knowledge intensity they represent (see 
Section 3 for details). 
Further, it has been shown that ownership structures in firms are often industry-
specific (see e.g., Demsetz, 1983 and Demsetz and Lehn, 1985 for theoretical evidence and 
Thomsen and Pedersen, 1998 for empirical evidence). Therefore, we employ industry-sector 
dummies in the first stage to capture the specific effects of various sectors so that these effects 
do not interfere with the ownership effects in the second stage. For the same reason we also 
include in specification (2) yearly time dummies (φt) that control for time-specific effects 
(country-wide economic development and business cycle) that are equal for all firms but vary 
over time. Finally, the random error is denoted as vit as in (1) and uit ≥ 0 represents financial 
inefficiency. Producer effects are required to be nonnegative because they represent the 
degree of financial inefficiency. 
Specification (2) is based on the assumption that production technology changes over 
time as in the time-varying technical efficiency stochastic production frontier panel data 
model proposed by Cornwell et al. (1990) and Kumbhakar (1990). Inefficiency is formalized 
as ( ) iiit uTtu )(exp −−= η , where Ti is the last period in the panel of i firms. Parameter eta (η) 
enables distinguishing whether the efficiency increases or decreases over time. If η> 0 the 
firm’s efficiency increases over time, while efficiency decays if η< 0. Because t = Ti in the last 
period, the last period for firm i contains the base level of inefficiency for that firm. If η> 0, 
the level of efficiency increases toward the base level, and if η< 0, the level of efficiency 
decays toward the base level. If there are no changes in technology, (in)efficiency remains the 
same over time (η = 0) and the time-varying model reduces to the time-invariant version. 
Under the time-invariant assumption the technical inefficiency parameter uit = ui, where uiis 
iid-distributed (~) according to a truncated-normal distribution that is truncated at zero with 
mean µ and variance σ2u (ui ~ N+(µ, σ2u). Then ui and vit (vit ~ N(µ, σ2v) are distributed 
independently from each other and from the covariates in the model. 
The above approach allows for efficiency to be influenced by factors outside the firm’s 
control. We can distinguish random shocks that affect the production frontier (machinery 
breakdown, new policies affecting access to or utilization of inputs, etc.) from factors over 
which the firm has some control (workforce size, skill and effort, capital utilization, etc). The 
specification itself is estimated as a panel with fixed effects to alleviate the potential problem 
of the endogeneity of firm ownership with respect to efficiency. During the estimation stage 
we formally test for a correct first stage specification, e.g., whether to use the time-invariant 
or time-varying efficiency model. 
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2.3 Empirical approach – Second stage 
Ownership structures have been identified in numerous relevant studies as a key determinant 
of firm performance (see Estrin et al., 2009 for a general overview and Hanousek et al., 
2007a, 2009 for specific results related to Czech firms). Therefore, in the second stage we 
model how firm efficiency (ui) is determined by its ownership structure: (ui) = f (ownership 
structure); a formal model is introduced later in this section. Specifically, we aim to answer 
the questions, formulated as hypotheses that appear below. 
The literature examining the agency problem arising from the separation of ownership 
and control often argues that managers might follow other goals than the owners would like. 
Because of this a concentrated ownership structure might lead to higher firm efficiency since 
it results in the superior monitoring of managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Hill and Snell, 
1989). Therefore we expect that there will be a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and efficiency. As pointed out above we are able to identify all owners with 
ownership stakes of at least 10 percent; sometimes, but definitely not as a rule, we are able to 
indentify dispersed ownership of less than 10%. Therefore, we are able to test whether the 
baseline relationship between ownership concentration and efficiency holds and formulate a 
baseline hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: A majority owner reduces a firm’s inefficiency. 
 Empirical works show that majority owners can change their attitude when a strong 
minority owner is present in the firm, for example in the case of dividend payments 
(Gugler,2003). We speculate that a majority owner, when confronted with a strong minority 
owner, might also affect a firm’s financial efficiency. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Majority owners, when confronted with strong minority owners, reduce a firm’s 
inefficiency more compared to uncontested majority owners. 
 The findings of agency theory indicate that control is a very good mechanism to assure 
that managers work to help owners. In other words, dispersed and/or minority ownership 
should not improve a firm’s efficiency as control is very likely to be missing in such an 
ownership structure. On the other hand, in the presence of highly dispersed ownership, even a 
minority owner with a sufficiently high stake is able to control a firm; for example, La Porta 
et al. (1999) employ 20% as a threshold for control of a company. Control can be exerted to 
ensure that managers fulfill their duties. Our data allows us to test the link between control 
and efficiency as we are able to identify dispersed ownership as well as monitored and/or 
controlling minority ownership. Based on this reasoning we formulate the following two 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: Minority and dispersed ownership both reduce a firm’s inefficiency. 
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Hypothesis 4: Minority owners in the presence of highly dispersed remaining ownership 
reduce a firm’s inefficiency. 
Further, in the trade literature it has been argued that foreign owners have better access 
to technology and therefore firms owned by foreigners should be more efficient (Temouri et 
al., 2008; Blomström et al., 2001). Hence, existence of the technological gap between foreign 
and domestic owners has become a stylized fact in the applied trade literature. Based on this 
we formulate the next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: A foreign owner reduces a firm’s inefficiency. 
The economic convergence literature usually analyses various types of convergence on 
the macroeconomic level (Barro, 1991; Bernard and Durlauf, 1995; Ben-David, 1996). 
However, the origin of the aggregated macroeconomic outcomes has to be sought on the 
micro level. For a considerable period of time, domestic and foreign owners were both present 
in the Czech economy through their property stakes in firms and corporations. They interacted 
through business activity as well as through various technology transfers (Kosová, 2009). 
Following this line of reasoning we formulate our final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: There exists a convergence in the contribution to a firm’s efficiency between 
domestic and foreign owners. 
We aim to test the above hypotheses by employing a model that links firm efficiency 
with ownership structure. The model for each year (period t) is specified as follows: 
 
 ∑
=
+=
J
j
j
iji OWNu
1
δα   for all i =1,…N.     (4) 
 
The ownership structure (OWNij) is defined for each firm i to distinguish a specific ownership 
category j. We distinguish domestic- and foreign-owned private firms based on exact 
knowledge of the owner’s origin. If there is missing information on the owner’s domicile we 
introduce a special category of “unknown” domicile, so we consider the categories of 
domestic, foreign, and unknown-domicile owners. From our data we can also distinguish the 
extent of ownership concentration along with the extent of control over a firm. Following the 
country- and legal-specific approach of Hanousek et al. (2007a), we construct ownership 
categories to distinguish majority owners (stake above 50%), monitoring owners, minority 
owners (stake above 33%), and dispersed ownership. We elaborate more on the ownership 
categories in the data section. 
To conclude, specification (4) recognizes that ownership structure affects firm 
efficiency. In the trade literature it is usually argued that only very productive firms are able to 
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be internationally active (Melitz, 2003). As these firms have acknowledge advantage the 
foreign-owned firms are able to increase their efficiency via spillovers. Moreover, it is likely 
that foreign owners have more experience in the business environment as well as better access 
to superior technologies (Temouri et al., 2008). This can result in better efficiency. Another 
explanation of the productivity gap between foreign- and domestic-owned firms could be 
differential access to external credit (Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 2010). This reason is 
largely absent in the case of the Czech Republic, though. Access to external financing was 
relatively easy before banks were fully privatized and banking privatization was achieved by 
2001 (Hanousek at al., 2007b). After EU accession in 2004 the frictions on the lending market 
were largely absent as the country complied with acquis communautaire. 
Specification (4) is estimated as a cross-section for a sequence of years (time periods 
t).4 Based on the estimates obtained from (4) we are able to test our hypotheses that link firm 
efficiency with firm ownership. 
 
3. Data 
We develop a model to examine the impact of ownership structure on firm financial efficiency 
in the Czech Republic. We employ firm-level unbalanced panel data for the period 1996–2007 
from the Amadeus database. Depending on the specific year, we have firm-level balance sheet 
data (turnover, working capital, and staff costs) for 3,818 to 87,268 firms. As these are 
multiproduct firms we are unable to obtain exact information about the quantities (input, 
output) connected with the production process of each product of a firm. For this reason we 
follow the standard approach in the literature and employ financial variables from firms’ 
balance sheets (see Coelli et al., 2005 for an overview). We further combine the balance-sheet 
data with ownership data obtained from the Amadeus, Aspekt, and Čekia databases. 
Altogether we work with a unique firm-level panel data of more than 400,000 firm/year 
observations for the period 1996–2007. 
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables are presented in Table 1. The number of 
firms increases dramatically from 1996 on, confirming our argument in Section 1 that early 
studies relying on unrepresentative samples could not deliver accurate results. Further, since 
our data set is constructed from several editions of the Amadeus database, we include in our 
data set also firms that might disappear from more recent editions. This way we minimize 
selection and survival biases. The mean values of all the variables are in natural logarithms. 
                                                 
4 This estimation approach was chosen for the following reason. Assume a highly efficient firm with an 
ownership structure that is rigid, e.g., it does not change over time or at least is quite stable. If specification (4) is 
estimated as a panel with fixed effects, then we would not be able to estimate effect of ownership on efficiency 
because rigid ownership would be included in the fixed effect. Since we want to avoid precisely this, we opt for 
the sequential estimation of cross-sections. 
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As can be seen from the values of the mean of working capital as well as staff costs, more and 
more of the smaller firms enter our dataset as time progresses. This is in accord with the 
values for turnover, which decrease with time as well. 
In the first stage we derive firm efficiency based on the two-input (capital, labor) 
Cobb-Douglas production specification introduced in Section 2. We use turnover to measure 
the production of each firm and as inputs we employ working capital (capital) and staff costs 
(labor).5 In specification (2) we include annual time dummy variables serving as a deflator of 
our financial variables in the same manner as Sabirianova et al. (2005a). As firm efficiency 
might be industry-specific (Pavitt, 1984), we include industry sectors as a vector of 
explanatory variables as well. Industry sectors are identified according to the two-digit NACE 
category. In order to capture different effects across sector-specific intensities we follow the 
approach of Laafia (2002), who divides industries into different sectors based on their 
technology and knowledge intensity. This approach is based on the Eurostat official 
industrial-sector aggregations. Hence, following the official Eurostat methodology we define 
several groups of industries in manufacturing and services to reflect the different degrees of 
technology and knowledge they represent. In manufacturing industries we have four groups: 
high technology, medium-high technology, medium-low technology, and low technology. In 
service industries we have five groups: knowledge-intensive services (KIS), high-tech KIS, 
market KIS (excluding financial intermediation and high-tech services), less-knowledge-
intensive services (LKIS), and market LKIS. Tables1.A and 2.A in the Appendix provide an 
overview of the development of the financial variables in firms across these sectors. The firms 
that achieve the best results in terms of highest turnover are medium-high and low technology 
firms in the manufacturing sector and LKIS and market LKIS firms in the service sector. 
Further, Table 3.A contains a list of all the NACE two-digit industries grouped into sectors 
according to the official Eurostat methodology. In this table we also show in great detail how 
firms are distributed according to the sector they belong to and the proportion of firms 
belonging to a specific sector with respect to the total sample. 
In Table 2 we provide descriptive statistics across the manufacturing and service 
groups defined above. The table indicates that approximately two thirds of our firms are from 
the service sector. The number of firms dramatically increases irrespective of whether the firm 
                                                 
5 In order to show that our results are robust to the use of different input proxies we estimate the Cobb-Douglas 
function with total assets, fixed assets, and total capital as proxies for capital and number of employees as a 
proxy for labor. Note that staff costs and number of employees are close measures of labor intensity since within 
a given industrial sector we can expect a relatively stable wage distribution as shown by Krueger and Summers 
(1988) as well as Crinò (2005) specifically for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. We prefer to use staff 
costs because only for a small number of firms is the number of employees available; plus for the period 1996–
1997 we have no records on number of employees. 
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is in the service or manufacturing sector. However, the largest increase can be observed in the 
low-tech manufacturing sector and less knowledge-intensive services. The values of turnover, 
staff costs, and capital indicate that more and more smaller firms enter our data as time 
progresses. We can observe such changes in both the manufacturing and service sectors. 
In the second stage we examine the impact of the ownership structure on estimated 
efficiency. Ownership type and concentration has been recognized as an important 
determinant of firm performance in developed economies (Temouri et al., 2008; Hill and 
Snell, 1989) as well as emerging economies (Estrin et al., 2009; Pivovarsky, 2003). We define 
the ownership variables with respect to country-specific legal rules as argued in Gugler 
(2003). Following Hanousek et al. (2007a) we define several ownership variables to reflect 
different concentration thresholds based on the country’s legal rules. Depending on their 
stakes, different blockholders have under Czech law different opportunities to influence 
corporate governance. In particular, the law provides important rights of ownership and 
control to owners with majority ownership (more than 50% of shares), blocking minority 
ownership (more than 33% but not more than 50% of shares) and what we define as legal 
minority ownership (at least 10 but not more than 33%of shares). Majority ownership grants 
the owner the right to staff management and supervisory boards, alter and transfer firms' 
assets and make crucial strategic decisions at general shareholder meetings. Through 
management and supervisory boards, majority ownership also facilitates more direct 
executive control of the company. Blocking minority ownership gives the right to block a 
number of decisions, such as those related to increasing or reducing assets and implementing 
major changes in business activities that the majority shareholder can try to implement at a 
general shareholder meeting. Finally, legal minority ownership is potentially important 
because the law entitles the holder of this stake to call a general shareholder meeting and 
obstruct decisions by delaying the implementation through lengthy court proceedings. 
Effective legal minority shareholders (including the state) may thus use their ownership 
position to delay or completely block the implementation of decisions by stronger 
shareholder(s). 
Majority and blocking minority ownership represent different degrees of concentrated 
ownership, while legal minority ownership can be viewed as a form of moderately dispersed 
ownership. Highly dispersed ownership arises when the stake of the largest holder does not 
reach the legal (10 percent) minority. Based on the above definitions of ownership 
concentration, we define several specific ownership categories. Rather than using exact 
percentage stakes, we opt for dummy variables that differentiate various ownership categories 
and allow us to provide more comprehensive results. All ownership categories are exclusively 
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defined and they are also distinguished for domestic and foreign owners, as well as those 
without a known domicile. 
Majority ownership is a dummy variable that is coded 1 when an owner holds more 
than a 50% stake in a firm and otherwise there is only dispersed ownership; it is coded 0 
otherwise. This category provides the majority owner with effective control over the 
company. 
Monitored majority ownership is a dummy variable that is coded 1 when there is 
majority ownership in a firm but at the same time there exists at least one minority owner 
with a stake higher than 10%; it is coded 0 otherwise. This ownership category reflects the 
situation in firms where the majority owner is often confronted with at least one non-marginal 
owner pursuing its own interest. 
There are two minority-category variables. First, controlling minority ownership is a 
dummy variable that is coded 1 when an owner holds a stake in a firm that is greater than 10% 
and this stake is greater than the sum of all the remaining stakes that can be identified, e.g. the 
remaining stakes of all the listed companies. It is coded 0 otherwise. This is an extreme case 
of control provided through a minority stake in a company with highly dispersed ownership. 
It is a realistic category as in numerous companies dispersed ownership prevents the 
emergence of larger stakes. This category has two implications relevant for our analysis. One, 
at general shareholder meetings dispersed owners would have to act in concert to override the 
decision of the single controlling minority owner. Two, according to the law, shareholders 
have to disclose their identities in order to commonly execute shareholder rights by 
agreement. In this case, their identities would be revealed and listed in the registry, and the 
database would contain the ownership identities of highly dispersed owners. 
Combined controlling minority ownership is the second minority category that is 
coded 1 when there are two owners whose combined stake exceeds 50% and 0 otherwise. 
These two owners cannot individually control the firm or act against each other as 
individually they do not have enough voting power. However, they can (but don’t have to) 
coordinate their steps and control the company via combined voting rights, which give them a 
majority. 
Dispersed ownership is a dummy variable that is coded 1 when all owners hold stakes 
smaller than 10% in the firm and there is no majority or minority owner); it is coded 0 
otherwise. 
As noted earlier, we are able to distinguish domestic and foreign owners for a many of 
the firms in our data set. However, for all the categories defined above we introduce 
additional dummy variables to capture the ownership when the owner’s domicile cannot be 
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identified. Either an owner is listed in the database without a country code identifying its 
domicile, or a firm has a legal structure that prevents distinguishing between domestic and 
foreign owners; e.g., a firm with unregistered stocks. Finally, a constant captures unknown 
ownership of a firm. In this case the firm either exhibits highly dispersed ownership or does 
not report on its ownership. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Results from the first stage are presented in Table 2. By employing a likelihood ratio test we 
formally test for the efficiency frontier specification and based on the results we opt for the 
time-invariant efficiency frontier model. The contribution of capital and labor to firm 
production differs as the coefficient associated with labor is uniformly larger than that of 
capital. This finding indicates that firms are on average more labor-intensive. Further, we also 
formally tested whether the sum of the coefficients associated with both inputs is statistically 
different from unity; this would indicate constant returns-to-scale production. The results of 
these tests show that the sum of the coefficients is smaller than one (about 0.8 on average), a 
level indicating decreasing returns-to-scale (DRS). Hence, we can conclude that larger firms 
exhibit lower efficiency. In Tables 4.A and 5.A in the Appendix we present the first-stage 
results in much greater detail across the manufacturing and service sectors introduced in 
Section 3. In general, the pattern of the DRS found in Table 2 remains the same at this 
detailed level, but there are two exceptions. Sector 34 (manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, 
and semi-trailers) exhibits constant returns-to-scale (CRS) with the coefficients’ sum being 
1.004. Sector 35 (manufacture of other transport equipment) exhibits increasing returns-to-
scale (IRS) with the coefficients’ sum being 1.142. We attribute this finding to advances in 
technology brought into the Czech automotive industry, which has been rapidly developing 
over the past years. 
First, in Table 3 we present the results of the determination of efficiency by ownership 
category without distinguishing among the technology- or knowledge-intensive sectors in 
which firms operate. We present the ownership concentration categories in the left column. 
Each subsequent column then contains coefficients for the distance from the efficiency 
frontier for a specific ownership category and specific year. Coefficients are presented as full-
set-of-dummies coefficients and should be interpreted in the following manner. A fully 
efficient firm would have a distance from the efficiency frontier equal to zero. Hence, the 
larger the value of a statistically significant coefficient associated with an ownership category, 
the further the category’s distance from the efficiency frontier. Hence, a particular type of 
ownership category is associated with lower contribution to firm efficiency. In other words, 
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positive coefficients closer to zero are associated with a greater impact of a specific 
ownership category on firm efficiency. Differences in coefficients’ values over time are due to 
changes in our data set: firms with a specific ownership structure enter and leave the data set 
and ownership structure changes over time. Further, the composition of firms changes: more 
and more small and medium firms are included in the data set and they also bring larger 
fluctuations in their financial balances. However, we estimate financial efficiency with firm-
specific fixed effects and we also account for economic trends by having annual dummies in 
specification (2). Hence, the coefficients presented in Table 3 (as well as in Tables4 and 5) 
should capture the true effect of the specific ownership category. 
 Majority ownership exhibits on average a strong impact on firm efficiency because 
coefficients are consistently small (ranging from 0.041 to 0.132) and below the values for 
most other ownership (concentration) categories. This result is in accord with agency theory. 
Further, we can see that the coefficient values associated with foreign owners are slightly 
smaller (coefficient range 0.044 to 0.124) than those of domestic shareholders (coefficient 
range 0.041 to 0.132). Hence, foreign owners contribute to a firm’s efficiency to a somewhat 
larger degree than domestic owners. The differences in coefficients between oreign and 
domestic owners vary with time due to the unbalanced nature of our panel and are more 
pronounced during the late 1990s. However, the differences disappear after 2004, hinting at a 
convergence in corporate governance as well as in other aspects between foreign- and 
domestic-controlled firms. As the date coincides with the accession to the European Union, 
the fact that the difference disappears hints at the disciplining effect of this event. In those 
firms where the domicile of the majority owner is unknown, the financial efficiency is by far 
the poorest of all the remaining categories. In these firms we also do not know the type of 
legal entity on top of the unknown domicile. This is a perfect proxy for non-transparent 
ownership that is associated with low efficiency. Inefficiency means that either the firm is 
poorly managed or financial efficiency is not a primary goal and the low efficiency might 
even be achieved on purpose. 
In firms where a majority owner is confronted with the presence of a minority owner 
or owners the ownership structure is conducive to the firm’s efficiency in general. This 
monitored majority helps to improve firm efficiency especially when the majority owner is of 
domestic origin as coefficient values are consistently smaller (coefficient range 0.023 to 
0.091) than the values associated with foreign owners (coefficient range 0.094 to 
0.219).However, there is a lack of statistically significant coefficients for half of the years in 
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the case of foreign owners.6 Further, the monitored domestic majority category correlates with 
firm efficiency at a better level than a simple domestic majority. This finding is important as it 
hints at a positive disciplining effect with respect to firm efficiency when a majority owner 
must account for the presence of an influential minority shareholder. It also has a 
straightforward implication for corporate governance as it resembles the composition of a 
board of directors where some positions are staffed by independent outside directors. 
Minority owners whose stakes are still larger than combined stakes of the rest of the 
known owners also contribute to firm efficiency but the effect of minority ownership is less 
conclusive for foreign owners due to statistically insignificant coefficients. Further, domestic 
minority owners impact firm efficiency to a greater degree (coefficient range 0.027to 0.105) 
than foreign owners (coefficient range 0.044 to 0.176). This is a similar pattern as with 
monitored majority owners. The differences between the extents of the impact are much 
smaller, though. In any event, these results also show that ownership concentration enabling 
even weakly grounded control tends to bring better results than purely dispersed ownership. 
Minority owners whose combined shares provide them with a majority of the voting 
rights—controlling minority ownership—are a special ownership category in terms of 
contribution to firm efficiency. In general, statistically significant coefficients are associated 
with domestic owners as coefficients associated with foreign ownership lack significance. The 
consistently smallest coefficients (ranging from 0.013 to 0.049) indicate that this ownership 
category is more conducive to firm efficiency than other categories discussed above. The 
reason might stem from the fact that two minority owners face the situation where neither of 
them can fully control the company and only their coordinated steps would enable them to 
jointly control the company. The inability to fully control a firm by one of the two minority 
owners resembles a “Mexican standoff”. This slang term defines a stalemate or a 
confrontation that neither of the parties can win. To come out of the deadlock the parties must 
resolve the situation by negotiation, surrender, or attack. The consistently very low values of 
the coefficients associated with domestic owners hint at a peaceful use of power between the 
two minority shareholders and a contributing effect of this ownership arrangement with 
respect to firm efficiency. Alternatively, firms can be established from the beginning as having 
cooperating co-owners, so a deadlock is averted. 
Finally, dispersed ownership is intuitively a problematic category to judge. Lack of 
statistically significant coefficients and their relatively large values do not allow for an easy 
                                                 
6 Lack of statistical significance can also mean that the category of monitored majority foreign ownership during 
the period 1996–2000 contains the most efficient firms as the coefficients are close to zero. The reason is that 
when we assess our hypotheses in effect we test that the coefficient equals zero. In the case of a very small and 
statistically insignificant coefficient we are unable to reject the hypothesis that the distance from the efficiency 
frontier equals zero. 
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evaluation. However, dispersed ownership does not seem to be conducive to improving firm 
efficiency as the few statistically significant coefficients are quite large. The same results 
apply to the ownerships we are unable to identify, which are captured by a constant, where 
mostly very large coefficients are found. 
 Further, in Tables 4 and 5 we present results that distinguish ownership effects 
depending on the economic sectors firms operate in. We distinguish four manufacturing 
sectors based on technology levels (Table 4) and five service sectors based on the knowledge 
intensity they represent (Table 5). As mentioned in Section 3, this division strictly adheres to 
the methodology of Eurostat. 
 From Table 4 we can see that on average the owners of firms belonging to the 
medium-low- and low-technology sectors are most conducive to firm efficiency. Then, in 
these sectors, domestic monitored-majority owners tend to be associated with the highest 
financial efficiency in the firms they control. It is also interesting to note that minority 
domestic owners who are able to exert control over firms because the rest of the ownership is 
dysfunctionally dispersed exhibit a comparably high degree of efficiency in firms across all 
four sectors. Even more interesting is the fact that firms belonging to opposite technology-
based edges (high- and low-technology sectors) exhibit equal and very good results. Finally, 
coalitions of two minority owners with the ability to jointly control firm drive efficiency in 
medium-low- and low-technology sectors and by this token they accord with the general 
pattern. 
 The results for firms operating in services are presented in Table 5. On average the 
owners of firms belonging to the sectors of less-knowledge-intensive services (LKIS) and 
market LKIS are most conducive to firm efficiency. On the contrary, firms in the sectors of 
KIS and market KIS exhibit exceptionally poor results that are witnessed by rather high 
coefficients. Finally, firms in high-tech KIS do quite well with majority and monitored-
majority foreign owners, driving the best efficiency results, while other categories offer a 
similar degree of efficiency irrespective of the owner’s domicile. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We analyze the evolution of financial efficiency in Czech firms during the period 1996–2007 
and how financial efficiency is determined by ownership structure. We provide evidence that 
ownership structure matters quite a lot and indicate numerous detailed results. Highly 
concentrated ownership is consistently beneficial to firm efficiency and this finding is in favor 
of agency theory. Not surprisingly, dispersed ownership is the least preferable option. 
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 On top of these more or less expected results we show that a simple majority is not 
necessarily the best structure to improve financial efficiency. A majority owner monitored by 
a strong minority owner (monitored majority) is more conducive to firm efficiency than a 
pure majority. Further, we find that cooperative coalitions of minority owners that allow for 
control in a firm bring superior results. Minority owners who share control in a firm may end-
up rivaling each other, which is not conducive to efficiency. However, our evidence points out 
that minority owners do cooperate and improve the financial efficiency of their firms. 
 We also show that financial efficiency is higher in less technology-demanding and 
less-knowledge-intensive firms. This finding may question to some extent the advancements 
of the Czech economy. On the other hand we find that after 2004, financial efficiency 
converges between domestic and foreign (majority) owners. This is certainly a positive 
feature hinting at improved management and corporate governance in Czech firms. 
 20
References 
 
Aigner, D., Lovell, C., & Schmidt, P. (1977). Formulation and estimation of stochastic 
frontier production functions. Journal of Econometrics, 6, 21-37. 
Aitken, B. J. and Harrison, A. E. (1999). Do domestic firms benefit from direct foreign 
investment? Evidence from Venezuela. American Economic Review 89(3), 605-618. 
Arnold, J. M. and Javorcik, B. S. (2009). Gifted kids or pushy parents? Foreign direct 
investment and plant productivity in Indonesia? Journal of International 
Economics79(1), 42-53. 
Barro, R. J. (1991). Economic Growth in Cross-Section of Countries. Quartely Journal of 
Economics, 106(2), 407–443. 
Battese, G., &Coelli, T. (1995). A model for technical inefficiency effect in a stochastic  
frontier production function. Empirical Economics, 20, 325-332. 
Ben-David, D. (1996). Trade Convergence Among Countries. Journal of International 
Economics, 40(3-4),279–298. 
Bernard, A. B. and Durlauf, S. N. (1995). Convergence in International Output. Journal of 
Applied Econometrics, 10(2), 97–108. 
Bjørnskov, C., Philipp Meinen, JørgenUlff-Møller Nielsen and Philipp J.H. Schröder, 2009. 
Lobbying for anti-dumping measures: Does distance from Brussels matter? Working 
paper, Department of Economics, Aarhus University 
Boycko, M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1996). A theory of privatization. Economic 
Journal 106(435), 309–319. 
Blomström, M. (1988): Labor productivity differences between foreign and domestic firms in 
Mexico. World Development 16(11), 12951298. 
Blomström, M., Globerman, S., and A. Kokko (2001). The Determinants of Host Country 
Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment. In N. Pain (ed.), Inward Investment, 
Technological Change and Growth. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Brada, J., King, A. (1994). Differences in the technical and allocative efficiency of private and 
socialized agricultural units in pre-transformation Poland. Economic Systems, 18(4), 
363-376.  
Brada, J., King, A. and Ma, C. (1994). Industrial economics of the transition: determinants of 
enterprise efficiency in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Oxford Economic Papers, 49, 
104-127.  
Brown, J. D., Earle, J. S and Telegdy, Á. (2006). The productivity Effects of Privatization: 
Longitudinal Estimates from Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. Journal of 
Political Economy 114(1), 61-99. 
Coelli, T.J. (2005). Recent Developmentsin FrontierModelling and 
EfficiencyMeasurement.Australian Journal ofAgricultual Economics 39(3), 219-45. 
Cornwell, C., Schmidt, P. and Sickles, R. C. (1990) Production Frontiers with Cross- 
Sectional and Time-Series Variation in Efficiency Levels, Journal of Econometrics 46: 
185-200. 
Claessens, Stijn, and Simeon Djankov. 1999. “Ownership Concentration and Corporate 
Performance in the Czech Republic.” Journal of Comparative Economics 27(3): 498-
513. 
Coelli T., PrasadaRao D.S. and G. E. Battese, 2005. An Introduction to Efficiency and 
Productivity Analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 21
Crinò, R. (2005). Wages, Skills and Integration in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic: 
an Industry-Level Analysis, Transition Studies Review, 12, 432-45. 
Demsetz, H. (1983). The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Law 
and Economics, 16, 375–390. 
Demsetz, H., and Lehn, K. (1985). The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and 
Consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1153–1177. 
Djankov, Simeon, and Peter Murrell. 2002. “Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A 
Quantitative Survey.” Journal of Economic Literature, 40(3): 739-92. 
Estrin, S., Hanousek, J., Kočenda, E., Svejnar, J., 2009. Effects of Privatization and 
Ownership in Transition Economies. Journal of Economic Literature, 47(3), 699-728. 
Gorodnichenko, Y. and Schnitzer, M. (2010), Financial constraints and innovation: Why poor 
countries don’t catch up. Working Paper 15792. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, MA 
Gugler, K., 2003. Corporate Governance, Dividend Payout Policy, and the Interrelation 
between Dividends, R&D, and Capital Investment. Journal of Banking and Finance 
27, 1297–1321. 
Haddad, M. and Harrison, A. E. (1993). Are there positive spillovers from direct foreign 
investment?: Evidence from panel data for Morocco, Journal of Development 
Economics 42(1), 51-74. 
Hájková, D. and Hurník, J. (2007). Cobb-Douglas Production Function: The Case of a 
Converging Economy. Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57 (9-10), 465-476. 
Hanousek, J., Kočenda, E. and Svejnar, J. (2007a). Origin and concentration: Corporate 
ownership, control and performance in firms after privatization. Economics of 
Transition 15(1), 1–31. 
Hanousek, J., Kočenda, E., Ondko, P., (2007a). The Banking Sector in New EU Member 
Countries: A Sectoral Financial Flows Analysis. Czech Journal of Economics and 
Finance, 57(5-6), 200-224. 
Hill, W. L. and Snell, S. A. (1989). Effects of Ownership Structure and Control on Corporate 
Productivity. The Academy of Management Journal, 32(1), 25-46. 
Ickes, B., and Ryterman, R. (1993). Entry without exit: economic selection under socialism. 
Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics Papers No. 10-93-4a. 
Kim, C., Mauer, D. C. and Sherman A. E. (1998). The determinants of corporate liquidity: 
theory and evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 33(3), 335-359. 
Konings, J., Repkin, A. (1998). How efficient are firms in transition countries? Firm-level 
evidence from Bulgaria and Romania. Transition Economics, No.1839, 1-26. 
Kosová, R. (2009). Do Foreign Firms Crowd Out Domestic Firms? Evidence from 
the Czech Republic. The Review of Economis and Statistics, 92 (4), 861-881. 
Krueger, A. B. and L. H. Summers (1988). Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry Wage 
Structure, Econometrica, 56(2), 259-293. 
Khumbhakar, S.C., 1990. Production Frontiers, Panel Data, and Time-Varying  
Technical Inefficiency. Journal of Econometrics 46: 201-211. 
Laafia, I. (2002). Employment in High Tech and Knowledge Intensive Sectors in the EU 
Continues to Grow in 2001. Eurostat, Statistics in Focus: Science and Technology 
9(4), 1-8. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1999, Corporate 
ownership around the world, Journal of Finance 54, 471–517. 
 22
Linz, S., Rahkovsky, I. (2009). Analyzing the technical efficiency of Russian firms: 1992-
1995. (April 27, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1395803 
Meeusen, W., van den Broeck, J. (1977). Efficiency estimation from Cobb-Douglas 
production functions with composed error. International Economic Review, 18(2), 
435-444. 
Melitz, M. J., (2003). The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate 
Industry Productivity. Econometrica 71 (6), 1695-1725. 
Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D., Yeung, B. 2005. “Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, 
and Growth.” Journal of Economic Literature, 43(3): 655-720. 
Pavitt, K., (1984). Sectoral patterns of technical change: towards a theory and a taxonomy. 
Research Policy 13, 343–373. 
Pivovarsky, A. (2003). Ownership Concentration and Performance in Ukraine’s Privatized 
Enterprises. IMF Staff Papers 50(1), 10-42. 
Ross, S. A., Westerfield, R. W. and Jeffrey, J. (2005), Corporate Finance, 7th International 
edition; McGraw Hill. 
Sabirianova Peter, K., Svejnar, J. and Terrell, K. (2005a). Foreign Investment, Corporate 
Ownership, and Development: Are Firms in Emerging Markets Catching up to the 
World Standard? IZA DP1457. 
Sabirianova Peter, K., Svejnar, J. and Terrell, K. (2005b). Distance to the efficiency frontier 
and foreign direct investment spillovers. Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 3(2-3), 576-586. 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of 
Finance, 52(2): 737-83. 
Temouri, Y., N.L. Driffield and D.A. Higón, 2008. Analysis of productivity differences among 
foreign and domestic firms: Evidence from Germany, The Review of World 
Economics, 144(1), 32-54. 
Thomsen, S., and Pedersen, T. (1998). Industry and ownership structure. International Review 
of Law and Economics, 18, 386–404. 
 23
 
Table 1: Simple descriptive statistics (all variables are in logs) 
Year Turnover Working capital Staff costs Number of firms 
1996 15.06 9.39 13.04 3 818 
1997 14.78 9.25 12.81 4 335 
1998 14.80 9.10 12.90 5 248 
1999 14.57 8.97 12.65 6 609 
2000 14.47 8.95 12.51 8 301 
2001 14.32 8.82 12.40 11 242 
2002 13.03 7.62 11.32 27 032 
2003 12.74 7.15 11.06 44 649 
2004 12.70 7.02 11.04 60 238 
2005 12.40 6.93 10.79 72 550 
2006 12.36 6.84 10.77 87 268 
2007 12.55 6.96 10.94 79 418 
 
 
 
Table 2: First step – efficiency frontiers 
 
NACE Grouping Constant 
term
Log Working 
Capital
Log Staff 
Costs 
Manufacturing industries:    
High-technology  13.026 0.163 0.683 
Medium-high-technology 12.566 0.121 0.757 
Medium-low-technology 12.561 0.101 0.772 
Low-technology 13.255 0.135 0.694 
Service industries:   
Knowledge-intensive services (KIS) 13.500 0.123 0.662 
High-tech KIS 14.068 0.111 0.629 
Market KIS* 13.388 0.127 0.670 
Less Knowledge-intensive services (LKIS) 13.953 0.157 0.639 
Market services less KIS 13.971 0.159 0.637 
 
Notes: We use industry classification according to OECD-Eurostat as in Laafia 2002. The division is available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an2.pdf . The exact division as well as 
short description of each NACE code can be found in the Appendix, Table 3.A.  
In the table we present weighted averages of estimated coefficients; weights correspond to the number of the 
observations. Detailed results of the first stage for each double digit industry are available in Table 4.A 
(manufacturing) and 5.A. (services). 
* Market KIS excludes financial intermediation and high-tech services. 
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Table 3: Effects of the ownership structure on the financial efficiency 
 Ownership category 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
0.026 c 0.031 a 0.056 a 0.061 a 0.048 a 0.044 a 0.071 a 0.083 a 0.079 a 0.121 a 0.124 a 0.114 a Majority foreign 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
0.061 a 0.046 a 0.041 a 0.048 a 0.049 a 0.05 a 0.094 a 0.115 a 0.132 a 0.12 a 0.12 a 0.113 Majority domestic (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
0.332 a 0.162 a 0.269 a 0.176 a 0.159 a 0.105 a 0.261 a 0.206 a 0.199 a 0.19 a 0.198 a 0.191 a Majority unknown (0.107) (0.058) (0.066) (0.056) (0.029) (0.050) (0.062) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
0.001 0.072 0.002 0.001 0.015 0.042 c 0.126 a 0.157 a 0.094 c 0.198 a 0.199 a 0.219 a Monitored majority 
foreign (0.076) (0.088) (0.061) (0.056) (0.037) (0.030) (0.031) (0.034) (0.049) (0.035) (0.035) (0.038) 
0.043 b 0.029 c 0.025 c 0.023 c 0.029 b 0.038 a 0.072 a 0.077 a 0.091 a 0.069 a 0.07 a 0.062 a Monitored majority  
domestic (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
0.016 0.025 0.072 0.01 0.202 a 0.196 a 0.171 a 0.189 a 0.182 a Monitored majority  
unknown N/A N/A N/A (0.168) (0.056) (0.137) (0.130) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
0.101 c 0.069 b 0.07 b 0.047 c 0.039 c 0.044 b 0.083 a 0.103 a 0.145 a 0.176 a 0.151 a 0.155 a Minority foreign (0.052) (0.030) (0.028) (0.025) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
0.027 a 0.034 a 0.039 a 0.035 a 0.041 a 0.034 a 0.085 a 0.099 a 0.105 a 0.11 a 0.104 a 0.098 a Minority domestic (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
0.001 0.115 b 0.011 0.008 0.062 c 0.063 c 0.145 a 0.162 a 0.222 a 0.25 a 0.257 a 0.236 a Controlling minority 
foreign (0.087) (0.058) (0.051) (0.056) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) 
0.026 b 0.014 c 0.015 0.013 c 0.016 b 0.014 c 0.037 a 0.046 a 0.049 a 0.045 a 0.048 a 0.047 a Controlling minority 
domestic (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
0.023 0.101 c 0.016 0.015 0.131 a 0.157 a 0.273 a 0.271 a 0.221 a 0.236 a 0.263 a 0.241 a Dispersed foreign 
 (0.110) (0.063) (0.062) (0.056) (0.040) (0.034) (0.037) (0.041) (0.042) (0.038) (0.039) (0.042) 
0.029 a 0.028 a 0.033 a 0.045 a 0.059 a 0.071 a 0.157 a 0.196 a 0.188 a 0.197 a 0.217 a 0.196 a Dispersed domestic (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
0.375 a 0.364 a 0.006 0.076 0.104 0.161 c 0.197 a 0.199 a 0.18 a 0.18 a 0.162 a Dispersed unknown N/A (0.108) (0.115) (0.119) (0.088) (0.137) (0.110) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
0.048 a 0.048 a 0.055 a 0.059 a 0.066 a 0.083 a 0.198 a 0.231 a 0.247 a 0.260 a 0.267 a 0.256 a Unknown ownership 
(1996) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R-squared 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.014 0.034 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.025 0.024 
N 3,818 4,335 5,248 6,609 8,301 11,242 27,032 44.649 60,238 72,550 87,268 79,418 
 
Note:  a, b, c denote the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Ownership effects in manufacturing industries: Sectors by EUROSTAT; all years 
 
Technology 
Ownership category  
High Medium-high Medium-low Low 
0.14a 0.017a 0.031a 0.022a Majority foreign 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) 
0.138a 0.045a 0.04a 0.019a Majority domestic 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
0.20b 0.094 0.097 0.046a Majority unknown 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) 
0.142a 0.018a 0.04c 0.087 Monitored majority  
foreign (0.028) (0.027) (0.039) (0.025) 
0.119a 0.017a 0.021a 0.022a Monitored majority  
domestic (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) 
0.089 0.088 0.126 0.09 Monitored majority  
unknown (0.013) (0.022) (0.024) (0.013) 
0.02a 0.034a 0.057a 0.018a Minority foreign 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) 
0.023a 0.027a 0.039a 0.019a Minority domestic 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) 
0.013a 0.048 0.053c 0.089 Controlling minority 
foreign  (0.027) (0.038) (0.032) (0.027) 
0.012a 0.018a 0.022a 0.013a Controlling minority 
domestic (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) 
0.009b 0.003a 0.001a 0.003b Controlling minority 
domestic (0.049) (0.033) (0.037) (0.038) 
0.125 0.125 0.103 0.089 Dispersed foreign 
(0.036) (0.045) (0.041) (0.027) 
0.071a 0.06a 0.056a 0.041a Dispersed domestic 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) 
0.094 0.035a 0.044a 0.076 Dispersed unknown 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) 
0.216a 0.22a 0.218a 0.156a Unknown ownership 
(1996) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
     
R-squared 0.023 0.042 0.039 0.026 
N 24,890 10,439 11,608 19,732 
 
Note:  a, b, c denote the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 5: Ownership effects in service sectors: Sectors by EUROSTAT; all years 
Ownership category 
Knowledge-
intensive 
services 
(KIS)
High-tech 
KIS
Market KIS 
(1)
Less Knowledge-
intensive Services 
(LKIS) 
Market 
services 
less KIS
0.216a 0.091a 0.248a 0.084a 0.084a Majority foreign 
(0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
0.185a 0.062a 0.209a 0.108a 0.111a Majority domestic (0.005) (0.013) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
0.316a 0.222 0.326a 0.185a 0.188a Majority unknown (0.005) (0.016) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
0.308 0.049a 0.417 0.146a 0.149a Monitored majority  
foreign (0.030) (0.052) (0.038) (0.022) (0.022) 
0.132a 0.106a 0.141a 0.057a 0.06a Monitored majority  
domestic (0.010) (0.023) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) 
0.267a 0.109a 0.293a 0.108a 0.199 Monitored majority  
unknown (0.010) (0.031) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) 
0.21a 0.048a 0.241a 0.161a 0.16a Minority foreign (0.015) (0.044) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) 
0.196a 0.097a 0.196a 0.082a 0.086a Minority domestic (0.009) (0.027) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
0.365 0.044c 0.389 0.204a 0.207 Controlling minority 
foreign (0.028) (0.092) (0.030) (0.019) (0.020) 
0.075a 0.05a 0.086a 0.042a 0.041a Controlling minority 
domestic (0.008) (0.015) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
0.126a 0.003c 0.029a 0.154a 0.155 Minority domestic (33) (0.038) (0.123) (0.051) (0.036) (0.036) 
0.292 0.22 0.371 0.002 0.002 Minority foreign (10) (0.294) (0.280) . (0.115) (0.115) 
0.484a 0.367b 0.471a 0.139a 0.144b Dispersed foreign (0.032) (0.076) (0.037) (0.024) (0.025) 
0.226a 0.101b 0.263a 0.182a 0.183b Dispersed domestic (0.014) (0.049) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) 
0.26a 0.092a 0.288a 0.216a 0.215 Dispersed unknown (0.014) (0.034) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) 
0.354a 0.207a 0.371a 0.207a 0.208a Unknown ownership 
(1996)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R-squared 0.031 0.036 0.027 0.019 0.019 
N 141,310 10,108 120,331 154,882 156,089 
 
Note:  a, b, c denote the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Appendix 
Table 1.A: Yearly descriptive statistics for manufacturing sectors by EUROSTAT grouping 
 
Technology 
year  Variable 
High Medium-high
Medium-
low Low 
Turnover 15.24 15.59 15.52 15.68 
Working capital 13.64 13.96 13.85 13.67 
Staff costs 9.83 10.38 10.07 10.1 
1996 
Observations 91 385 348 442 
Turnover 15.01 15.44 15.27 15.35 
Working capital 13.55 13.82 13.57 13.41 
Staff costs 9.94 10.29 10.02 10.03 
1997 
Observations 105 415 396 502 
Turnover 15.01 15.52 15.35 15.44 
Working capital 13.52 13.92 13.64 13.48 
Staff costs 9.56 10.14 9.96 9.85 
1998 
Observations 129 479 469 567 
Turnover 14.99 15.28 15.06 15.14 
Working capital 13.36 13.64 13.34 13.25 
Staff costs 9.59 10.01 9.66 9.71 
1999 
Observations 146 581 625 722 
Turnover 14.89 15.22 14.87 15.06 
Working capital 13.19 13.53 13.11 13.12 
Staff costs 9.58 10.01 9.57 9.71 
2000 
Observations 178 753 801 906 
Turnover 14.89 15.09 14.72 14.89 
Working capital 13.29 13.45 13 13.03 
Staff costs 9.46 9.9 9.37 9.52 
2001 
Observations 208 955 1106 1211 
Turnover 13.97 14.56 14.18 14.07 
Working capital 12.43 13.03 12.59 12.41 
Staff costs 8.29 9.12 8.54 8.54 
2002 
Observations 386 1397 1721 1925 
Turnover 13.57 14.34 13.99 13.71 
Working capital 12.1 12.82 12.4 12.08 
Staff costs 7.61 8.69 8.1 8 
2003 
Observations 592 1806 2405 2744 
Turnover 13.44 14.29 14.02 13.6 
Working capital 12.04 12.75 12.41 12.03 
Staff costs 7.43 8.52 8.05 7.68 
2004 
Observations 737 2159 3016 3464 
Turnover 13.29 14.14 13.84 13.36 
Working capital 11.83 12.55 12.25 11.8 
Staff costs 7.36 8.46 7.96 7.56 
2005 
Observations 799 2352 3433 3909 
Turnover 13.46 14.19 14.01 13.38 
Working capital 11.98 12.61 12.36 11.81 
Staff costs 7.24 8.35 8.01 7.45 
2006 
Observations 924 2520 3769 4217 
Turnover 13.76 14.43 14.3 13.56 
Working capital 12.21 12.84 12.64 12 
Staff costs 7.45 8.54 8.15 7.54 
2007 
Observations 823 2258 3367 3731 
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Table 2.A: Yearly descriptive statistics for service sectors by EUROSTAT grouping 
 
year  Variable 
Knowledge-
intensive 
services (KIS)
High-tech 
KIS
Market 
KIS*
Less Knowledge-
intensive Services 
(LKIS) 
Market 
services less 
KIS
Turnover 14.1 14.59 14.02 14.97 15.01
Working capital 12.39 12.95 12.35 12.27 12.26
Staff costs 7.79 8.19 7.84 8.98 8.98
1996 
Observations 660 70 489 1 149 1 155
Turnover 13.73 14.4 13.6 14.72 14.76
Working capital 12.19 12.85 12.11 12.08 12.07
Staff costs 7.66 8.09 7.71 8.85 8.871997 
Observations 793 98 582 1 308 1 314
Turnover 13.74 14.41 13.59 14.72 14.76
Working capital 12.32 12.96 12.23 12.23 12.22
Staff costs 7.59 7.92 7.68 8.75 8.75
1998 
Observations 1010 134 739 1 636 1 651
Turnover 13.61 14.25 13.43 14.52 14.55
Working capital 12.08 12.79 11.93 12.03 12.01
Staff costs 7.47 8.02 7.48 8.68 8.691999 
Observations 1 290 185 937 2 080 2 094
Turnover 13.46 14.06 13.28 14.44 14.47
Working capital 11.93 12.58 11.74 11.92 11.9
Staff costs 7.45 8.17 7.39 8.63 8.64
2000 
Observations 1535 223 1121 2 702 2 691
Turnover 13.23 13.91 12.99 14.27 14.31
Working capital 11.78 12.43 11.53 11.8 11.8
Staff costs 7.53 8.02 7.45 8.44 8.462001 
Observations 1 930 280 1 423 4 001 3 993
Turnover 11.81 12.91 11.56 12.99 13
Working capital 10.37 11.42 10.09 10.92 10.91
Staff costs 6.46 6.97 6.39 7.34 7.35
2002 
Observations 7265 716 5878 10 865 10 926
Turnover 11.7 12.67 11.5 12.73 12.74
Working capital 10.26 11.19 10.02 10.75 10.74
Staff costs 6.17 6.48 6.15 6.97 6.982003 
Observations 13 492 1 227 11 014 18 302 18 442
Turnover 11.72 12.65 11.53 12.74 12.75
Working capital 10.28 11.24 10.05 10.77 10.76
Staff costs 6.15 6.51 6.13 6.87 6.88
2004 
Observations 19416 1564 16171 24 493 24 680
Turnover 11.3 12.45 11.11 12.58 12.59
Working capital 9.9 11.11 9.64 10.68 10.67
Staff costs 6.02 6.37 5.98 6.83 6.842005 
Observations 26 100 1 757 22 391 28 020 28 246
Turnover 11.21 12.57 10.99 12.68 12.69
Working capital 9.78 11.26 9.51 10.82 10.82
Staff costs 5.93 6.38 5.87 6.83 6.83
2006 
Observations 34922 2025 30565 31 962 32 272
Turnover 11.35 12.79 11.14 12.91 12.92
Working capital 9.88 11.48 9.61 11.05 11.05
Staff costs 6.07 6.57 6.01 6.94 6.94
2007 
Observations 32897 1829 29021 28 364 28 625
 
Note:  * Market KIS excludes financial intermediation and high-tech services. 
Used groups are not mutually exclusive. 
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Table 3.A: Description and distribution of industries 
 
NACE Industry Obs. Share 
Manufacturing: High-technology 
30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 479 0.12%
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and 
apparatus 1 792 0.44%
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks 1 836 0.45%
Total   4 107 1.01%
Manufacturing: Medium-high-technology 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 2 310 0.56%
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 7 461 1.82%
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 4 597 1.12%
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1 257 0.31%
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 672 0.16%
Total   16 297 3.97%
Manufacturing: Medium-low-technology 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 3 983 0.97%
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 3 250 0.79%
27 Manufacture of basic metals 1 394 0.34%
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and eqp. 12 686 3.09%
Total   21 313 5.19%
Manufacturing: Low-technology 
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 6 754 1.64%
17 Manufacture of textiles 2 115 0.51%
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 1 528 0.37%
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, 
harness and footwear 539 0.13%
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 4 216 1.03%
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 967 0.24%
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 4 795 1.17%
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 2 907 0.71%
37 Recycling 519 0.13%
Total   24 340 5.93%
Unassigned sectors 
1 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities 12 144 2.96%
2 Forestry, logging and related service activities 1 363 0.33%
14 Other mining and quarrying 612 0.15%
40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 1 588 0.39%
41 Collection, purification and distribution of water 765 0.19%
45 Construction 27 456 6.69%
Total   43 928 10.71%
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Table 3.A. Description and distribution of industries - continued 
 
NACE Industry Obs. Share 
Knowledge-intensive services (KIS) 
64 Post and telecommunications 1 327 0.32%
65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding 956 0.23%
70 Real estate activities 67 332 16.39%
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and 
household goods 2 435 0.59%
72 Computer and related activities 8 033 1.96%
73 Research and development 748 0.18%
74 Other business activities 50 564 12.31%
80 Education 2 627 0.64%
85 Health and social work 2 960 0.72%
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 4 328 1.05%
Total   141 310 34.39%
High-tech KIS 
64 Post and telecommunications 1 327 0.32%
72 Computer and related activities 8 033 1.96%
73 Research and development 748 0.18%
Market KIS (excludes financial intermediation and high-tech services) 
70 Real estate activities 67 332 16.39%
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and 
household goods 2 435 0.59%
74 Other business activities 50 564 12.31%
Less Knowledge-intensive services (LKIS) 
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of 
automotive fuel 7 860 1.91%
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 74 821 18.22%
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and 
household goods 52 702 12.83%
55 Hotels and restaurants 9 673 2.36%
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 6 502 1.58%
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 4 531 1.10%
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities 2 279 0.55%
93 Other service activities 1 045 0.25%
Total   159 413 38.80%
Market services less KIS 
50 
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of 
automotive fuel 7 860 1.91%
51 
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 74 821 18.22%
52 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and 
household goods 52 702 12.83%
55 Hotels and restaurants 9 673 2.36%
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 6 502 1.58%
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 4 531 1.10%
    
Total   410,708   
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Table 4.A: First step – efficiency frontiers by two-digit NACE industry (Manufacturing) 
2-Digit  Constant Working capital Staff costs 
NACE Industry Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
High-technology manufacturing 
Office machinery and computers 13.052 a 0.354 0.242 a 0.024 0.657 a 0.034 
Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 12.987 a 0.225 0.148 a 0.016 0.699 a 0.021 
Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks  13.058 a 0.243 0.157 a 0.018 0.674 a 0.023 
Medium-high-technology manufacturing 
Chemicals and chemical products 12.355 a 0.220 0.143 a 0.017 0.775 a 0.021 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 12.879 a 0.147 0.112 a 0.011 0.737 a 0.013 
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 13.188 a 0.157 0.134 a 0.012 0.696 a 0.014 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 11.031 a 0.268 0.126 a 0.018 0.878 a 0.023 
Other transport equipment 8.428 a 0.359 0.042 c 0.030 1.100 a 0.032 
Medium-low-technology manufacturing 
Rubber and plastic products 11.877 a 0.177 0.100 a 0.013 0.835 a 0.016 
Other non-metallic mineral products 12.095 a 0.191 0.137 a 0.015 0.784 a 0.018 
Basic metals 12.538 a 0.296 0.112 a 0.020 0.778 a 0.025 
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 12.897 a 0.128 0.091 a 0.010 0.748 a 0.012 
Low-technology manufacturing 
Food products and beverages 12.890 a 0.148 0.123 a 0.011 0.754 a 0.013 
Textiles 12.921 a 0.218 0.240 a 0.016 0.636 a 0.020 
Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 13.591 a 0.264 0.148 a 0.018 0.627 a 0.024 
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, 
harness and footwear 14.129 a 0.440 0.136 a 0.030 0.611 a 0.040 
Wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture;  articles of straw and plaiting 
materials 13.389 a 0.170 0.134 a 0.013 0.678 a 0.016 
Pulp, paper and paper products 14.757 a 0.266 0.195 a 0.023 0.551 a 0.022 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 13.782 a 0.167 0.109 a 0.012 0.661 a 0.016 
Furniture 12.651 a 0.204 0.107 a 0.015 0.746 a 0.019 
Recycling 12.127 a 0.437 0.117 a 0.027 0.824 a 0.040 
 
Note: Industry Classification according to OECD-Eurostat (Laafia 2002). It is also available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an2.pdf .  
 a, b, c denotes the significance on 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 5.A: First step – efficiency frontiers by two-digit NACE industry (Service) 
 
2-Digit  Constant Working capital Staff costs 
NACE Industry Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Knowledge-intensive services (KIS) 
Post and telecommunications 13.628 a 0.269 0.127 a 0.018 0.704 a 0.026 
Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding 12.331 a 0.405 0.008 0.019 0.902 a 0.038 
Real estate activities 13.221 a 0.106 0.137 a 0.009 0.673 a 0.010 
Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household 
goods 13.636 a 0.195 0.135 a 0.014 0.677 a 0.018 
Computer and related activities 14.233 a 0.141 0.110 a 0.010 0.610 a 0.013 
Research and development 13.072 a 0.360 0.095 a 0.023 0.698 a 0.032 
Other business activities 13.599 a 0.105 0.112 a 0.008 0.666 a 0.009 
Education 13.976 a 0.230 0.122 a 0.016 0.558 a 0.021 
Health and social work 12.853 a 0.225 0.064 a 0.014 0.729 a 0.020 
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 15.714 a 0.179 0.138 a 0.012 0.499 a 0.017 
High-tech KIS 
Post and telecommunications 13.628 a 0.269 0.127 a 0.018 0.704 a 0.026 
Computer and related activities 14.233 a 0.141 0.110 a 0.010 0.610 a 0.013 
Research and development 13.072 a 0.360 0.095 a 0.023 0.698 a 0.032 
Market KIS (excludes financial intermediation and high-tech services) 
Real estate activities 13.221 a 0.106 0.137 a 0.009 0.673 a 0.010 
Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household 
goods 13.636 a 0.195 0.135 a 0.014 0.677 a 0.018 
Other business activities 13.599 a 0.105 0.112 a 0.008 0.666 a 0.009 
Less knowledge-intensive services 
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of 
automotive fuel 13.460 a 0.141 0.157 a 0.011 0.705 a 0.013 
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 14.172 a 0.100 0.170 a 0.008 0.621 a 0.009 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and hh goods 14.009 a 0.103 0.165 a 0.008 0.621 a 0.009 
Hotels and restaurants 13.346 a 0.132 0.127 a 0.011 0.664 a 0.012 
Land transport; transport via pipelines 12.942 a 0.154 0.074 a 0.011 0.776 a 0.014 
Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 13.910 a 0.188 0.070 a 0.011 0.720 a 0.017 
 
Note: Industry Classification according to OECD-Eurostat (Laafia 2002). It is also available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an2.pdf .  a, b, c denotes the significance on 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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